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Research on the determinants of audit fees has mostly focused on the U.S. and other countries. 
The Japanese Institute of Certified Public Accountants (JICPA) eliminated standard auditing 
fees in April 2004, leading to intense competition among audit firms. However, previous 
studies conducted in the U.S. and some European countries suggest that oligopolistic 
conditions exist. These studies also show that audit firms add additional inspection costs to 
the audit fees, when estimating further audit risks. This study aims to empirically confirm 
whether Japanese audit firm charge similar fees or if the auditors’ effort is reflected in audit 
fees. This study focuses on audit quality because firms cannot cover the cost of conducting an 
audit in competitive scenario with low fees, leading to a decline in audit quality. To examine 
the scenario after the enactment of the Financial Instruments and Exchange Act, commonly 
referred as the Japanese Sarbanes-Oxley (hereafter, J-SOX), this study uses variables that 
estimate internal control risks and corporate governance risks. In conclusion, this study 
confirms that Japanese audit firms conduct risk adjustment activities. 
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 1. Introduction 
Research has identified audit fee problems as the most important issue for the 
estimation of suitable audit fees. 
The monetary relationship between auditors and audit clients is a characteristic of 
auditing systems issues (Takada 2009). Audit and non-audit fees paid by clients express their 
connections making for the auditing. Using data from audit and non-audit fees, many studies 
examine whether the independence of auditors is impaired. Recent studies estimate the 
appearance of independence from the earnings response coefficient (ERC), cost of capital, 
shareholder activism, credit rating, rate of return of bonds, and so on(e.g., Francis and Ke 
2006, Higgs and Skants 2006, Krishnan et al. 2005, Khurana and Raman 2006). The 
independence of mental attitude is estimated by the contents of the audit opinion, and 
abnormal accounting accruals are proxies for the quality of disclosure statements (e.g., 
DeFond et al. 2002, Geiger and Rama 2003, Li 2009). These empirical studies were 
conducted to observe whether economic engagements between auditors and their clients 
impair the auditors’ independence. Studies in the 1980s considered the many factors and 
proxies as determinants of audit fees. Simunic (1980) famously used regression models for 
analysis in which audit fee determinants are divided into the following parts: size, 
complexities of operation, and risks to which auditors are exposed. In Japan, Yazawa (2009) 
and other researchers analyzed audit fees determinants (Kansanin Kansahoshu Kenkyukai 
 2012 (Japanese)). 
The focus of this study is to recognize the risks that auditors are exposed to and the 
effect of risk adjustment on audit fees. The proxies of size and complexity have been 
analyzed sufficiently in prior studies, while this study adopts the proxies of the effect of 
internal control disclosure (J-SOX) and corporate governance in regression models. This 
study examines whether the special inspection cost of audit is linked to audit fees . 
How do we estimate the appropriate proxy for risk when an auditor and client enter 
into an audit contract? This study considers the internal control risk and the effect of internal 
control disclosure. Following Simunic (1980), many studies use the proxy of litigation risks 
because material misstatemen such as inherent risks and control risks are connected to 
litigation risks in the U.S. In Japan, however, there are few instances of stakeholders filing 
lawsuits against companies because of audit issues. We aim to confirm whether these risks 
are accounted for in the audit fees and the auditors’ efforts. The following section includes a 
literature review of prior studies, and the hypotheses are discussed in section three. The 
research design is explained in section four, followed by the results. Finally, the last section 
offers the conclusion and implications. 
2. Prior studies 
  In this section, a review of previous studies on audit pricing and internal control is 
conducted. 
 2.1 Audit pricing studies 
  Simunic (1980) suggests that the cost of an audit depends on resources consumed by 
auditors and clients in addition to the cost of conducting the audit. Simunic analyzes the 
determinants of the cost of resources and the factor cost, which attribute to the differentiation 
of the audit fee. Simunic was the first to suggest the model of determinants of the audit fee.   
The observable audit cost (i.e., the audit fee) has a positive significant relationship to the 
auditors’ exposure to losses (the increase of inherent risks) and the amount of observable 
losses (the size and complexities of audit clients’ companies).  
Craswell et al. (1995) analyzes the relationships between brand name, expertise, and 
audit fees. They followed the step suggested by Simunic and constructed the model for audit 
fees by including brand reputation as a proxy. The results demonstrate that the audit fees of 
the Big 8 audit firms are 34% higher than others. It was also determined that the fees of the 
non-specialist Big 8 firms are 22% higher than that of other non-specialist firms. In addition, 
the specialist Big 8 firms earn a 16 % higher audit fee than the non-specialist Big8 firms.  
  Choi et al. (2010) define abnormal audit fees and they analyze the relationship 
between abnormal audit fee and discretionary accruals. They assumed discretionary accruals 
to be an audit quality issue and they estimated the discretionary accruals by utilizing the 
modified Jones model. They suggest that the relationship between positive discretionary 
accruals and abnormal audit fees has negative significance. This signifies that an abnormally 
 low audit quality corresponds to abnormally high audit fees. 
  In Japan, Kasai (2009) analyzed Choi’s framework with Japanese data and received 
significant results in the relationship between discretionary accruals and abnormal audit fees. 
2.2 Auditor’s independence 
  Simunic (1984) examined the relationship between consulting, auditing and auditor’s 
independence if the auditor provides both the consulting and the auditing service.  If the 
same auditor is conducting the audit and consulting the firm, it impacts negatively on the 
auditors’ brand image if there is a proven failure in consulting. Simunic declares that in 
auditing studies, the auditor’s independence is likely to be seen as ambiguous. However, 
supplying both services may affect both the independence of appearance and mental attitude. 
Specifically, consulting as a non-auditing service affects the companies’ external (market 
reaction) and internal control situations. Many studies have examined audit firms that provide 
both services in the U.S., Japan, and some other countries. Simunic suggested the following 
results as the initial findings. One is that the client pays a higher total fee if it engages the 
same auditor as the consultant. Secondly, if an audit firm performs as auditor and consultant, 
they provide a more efficient service, rendering the simultaneous service desirable.  
Hoitash et al.(2005) describe the change in the relationship between discretionary 
accruals and abnormal audit fees after the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (hereafter, 
SOX). They suggest that discretionary accruals are significantly related to abnormal audit 
 fees before SOX but are ambiguous after its enactment. They insist that abnormal audit fees 
affect discretionary accruals as a proxy of audit quality, and SOX impairs these relationships. 
They estimated the independence of mental attitude by discretionary accruals and suggest a 
relationship between independence of mental attitude and audit fees. 
2.3 Material Weakness 
  Hoitash et al.(2008) investigates the relationship among material weakness, 
significant deficiency, and audit fees. Companies that have insufficient internal control 
information based on the stipulation of Section 302 of SOX pay higher fees than companies 
that report based on SOX404. They insist that companies that declare information 
insufficiency pay higher fee because of risk adjustment. 
Hogan and Wilkins (2008) investigated the adjustment of the audit risk approach in 
the context of audit fees. The studies conducted before Hogan and Wilkins (2008) 
documented ambiguous results and were limited to one audit firm or one industry. They 
regarded the individual condition of managers or auditors. Hogan and Wilkins referred to 
these before conducting their study, which examines the audit fees charged when a 
company’s auditors document the internal control weaknesses. The study controls for factors 
such as inherent risks and information risks. This study concluded that companies that 
declared weak internal controls paid higher fees. 
Ashbaugh et al. (2008) described the relationship between the effects of internal 
 control weakness disclosure and the quality of accruals. Initially, they noted that low quality 
accruals were accompanied by the declaration of the information of internal control weakness. 
Second, they determined if companies with internal control weakness disclosure have 
abnormally high or low accounting accruals. Third, they determined that if the companies 
that needed to declare internal control weakness revised their findings in the next year, the 
accruals recovered. Fourth, they detected that auditors’ opinions were related significantly to 
accounting accruals. Hence, the U.S. data confirms that accounting accruals and internal 
control weakness have a significant relationship.  
3. Hypothesis 
3.1 Audit situation after the collapse of Chuo-Aoyama and Misuzu 
The Japanese audit environment was drastically affected by the Kanebo window 
dressing scandal resulting in the 2006 failure of the Chuo-Aoyama auditing firm (a member 
of PricewaterhouseCooopers). This was followed by the 2007 dissolution of Misuzu, the 
name under which Cho-Aoyama resumed operation. After these scandals, the determinants of 
audit fees changed significantly, and it is now impossible to determine how a firm will 
conduct an audit. The environment affects the competition between auditing firms, leading to 
new methods of gaining clients.  
  In addition, the audit fees paid by clients increases drastically because of the 
implementation of quarterly reviews and internal control reports (Kansanin Kannsahoshu 
 Kenkyukai, 2012). 
3.2 Developing the hypothesis 
Based on previous Japanese studies, we note the significant relationships between 
audit fees and clients’ size, complexity, and specific risks. This study suggests a hypothesis to 
verify whether auditors incorporate the special inspection cost into the audit fees by 
considering the internal control risks and governance risks in addition to inherent risks, 
leverage, and, profitability. We also determine if audit fees are affected by internal control 
risks and governance risks by using a regression of residual audit fees considering clients’ 
size, complexity, and specific risks that may include the internal control risks and governance 
risks. The residual audit fees are considered as abnormal audit fees information from Kasai 
(2009) and Fujiwara (2011). In addition to these analyses, this study adds variables to 
examine the efforts of auditors after they perceive the risks of financial distress or internal 
controls in the regression model. 
For an extensive analysis, it is essential use the delta of audit fees as the dependent 
variable in the regression model, but this study uses the stock variable of audit fees as the first 
step.  
I suggest the hypotheses stated below. 
H1: Auditing firms receive the audit fees according to the client’s internal control condition. 
H2: Auditing firms receive abnormal audit fees in accordance with the client’s internal 
 control framework. 
4. Research design 
4.1 Regression model 
For the inspection of hypothesis H1, this study analyzes the regression model as stated below, 
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In order to examine hypothesis H2, this study analyzes the following regression model to 
estimate abnormal audit fees: LNAuditFee =∝0 ＋ ∝1 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿＋ ∝2 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑣𝑣𝑟𝑟𝐶𝐶＋ ∝3 𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝑣𝑣𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿+∝4 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿＋ ∝5 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶 +∝6 𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶 +∝7 𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶 +∝8 𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝑣𝑣 +∝9 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑣𝑣+∝10 𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 +∝11 𝐵𝐵𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅4 +∝12 𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿ℎ𝐿𝐿𝑣𝑣𝐶𝐶 +∝13 𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿+∝ 𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶+
∝ 𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝑣𝑣𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶+∝ 𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑟𝑟 + 𝜀𝜀 
Using the above residual 𝜀𝜀 as AbAuditFee, we define the abnormal audit fees and analyze 
the regression as stated below: 
AbAuditFee =∝0+∝1 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴1𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿＋ ∝2 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴2𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿
+∝3 𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑣𝑣𝐶𝐶𝑣𝑣𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝑟𝑟＋ ∝4 𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴 +∝5 𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴+∝6 𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴 +∝7 𝐵𝐵𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵+∝8 𝐵𝐵𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵 +∝9 𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵+∝ 𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶+∝ 𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝑣𝑣𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 + 𝜀𝜀 
 4.2 Independent variable 
 This study considers the following six factors when consulting the regression model: 
(1)Clients’ size of operation 
(2)Clients’ complexity of operation 
(3)Clients’ specific risks 
(3-1) Inherent risk and financial distress risk 
(3-1-1) Risk variables 
  (3-1-2) Auditor effort after perceiving of financial distress risk 
(3-2) Leverage 
(3-3) Profitability 
(4) Auditor size 
(5) Clients’ internal control risk  
(5-1) Auditor’s effort after their perceiving internal control risk 
(5-2) Clients’ management risk 
(6)Clients’ governance risk 
Factors 1~4 are discussed in studies from Simunic (1980), Craswell et al. (1995), and Choi et 
al. (2010) 
This study adds to the findings regarding the efforts of auditors after perceiving the risks 
based on the prior research analysis. The variables RGC, SGC, CGC, RMW, SMW, and 
 CMW(all are defined in the Appendix) are the proxies of the effort of auditors.  
This study separates internal control risk into auditor’s effort after perceiving internal 
control risk (5-1), management risk (5-2). In previous studies, clients’ size, complexity, and 
specific risk were included in the estimation model. 
In this study the internal control risk is considered in the regression model along with 
clients’ size, complexity, and specific risks. According to the Committee of Sponsoring 
Organization of Treadway Commission’s (COSO) internal control-integrated framework 
(COSO 1992, COSO 1994 and this citation is referred to Japanese translations of COSO 1992 
and 1994 by Toba, Hatta, and Takada 1996), it has necessary for us to carefully consider the 
following situations: 
・Change in operating environment 
・New executives and employees 
・New and refined information systems  
・Rapid Growth 
・New techniques 
・New product lines, products, and operations 
・Foreign business 
In this framework, governance risk variables are used in the analysis to describe the 
status of the environment change in the operation. Management risk variables such as 
 switching auditors and managers flexibility are used to capture the risk of new executives 
and employees. The ratio of foreign sales to total sales is used to capture the risk of foreign 
business but this is considered a variable of the complexity of operations. 
The hypothesis on management risk and the auditor’s effort after perceiving internal 
control risk is explained. The higher the gain from managers’ switching, the higher is the 
management risk. As a result, auditors will require higher audit fees. On the other hand, there 
are very few instances of auditor switching in the Japanese market since it is considered very 
risky. Auditor switching is usually indicative of many internal control problems. This results 
in risk adjustment, possibly affecting audit fees. However, some studies that analyze the 
relationship between audit fees and auditor switching suggest that auditor switching is a 
factor of low-balling (discounting audit fees). This study aims to confirm whether auditor 
switching is indeed a risk factor. The auditor’s efforts after perceiving internal control risk are 
presented by material weakness data. If auditors declare material weakness, audit fees 
become higher than other conditions. However, in the low litigation countries such as Japan, 
there are few cases in which auditors require “hush money” from clients. This study suggests 
that some risk adjustment activities are a direct results risk perception. This study supposes 
that auditors gain more tasks after their declaration or perception of material weakness 
compared to other conditions. As previously stated, this study set the dummy variables as, 
RMW, SMW and CMW (As the same types of dummy variables, this study set RGC, SGC, 
 and CGC). 
In this section, I suggest governance risk variables. Corporate governance is usually 
defined as the stockholders’ supervision of management. Standard and Poor’s (hereafter, 
S&P) suggested a comprehensive quantification method (Ashbaugh et al. 2006) with four 
directionalities as detailed below: 
(1) Ownership structure and effect 
(2) Rights of stakeholders and their relationship to financial matters 
(3) Transparency and disclosure of financial matters 
(4) Board structure and processes 
Since corporate governance is also included internal controls, its proxies are suggested 
below. 
(1) I capture the situations by SPECIFICST which is the ratio of specific stockholders to all 
stockholders. 
(2) It is difficult to measure the proxies that tequnically express these situations in Japanese 
samples. As the Ashbaugh et al. (2006) study, the G-score is used. 
(3) I do not capture the situations because financial transparency does not directly affect the 
audit. Financial transparency is suggested by abnormal current accruals, but it is difficult to 
decide whether the transparency is expressed by abnormal current accruals only. 
(4) I capture the situations by BDOUTSIDE and BDSTOCK. BDOUTSIDE represents ratio 
 of outside board members to all board members and BDSTOCK represents ratio of share 
board members own. 
4.4 Sample selection 
I selected the samples as stated below: 
(1) Companies in the Japanese stock markets, excluding banks, insurance companies, 
securities, and other financial institutions 
(2) Companies that do not undergo a joint audit 
(3) Companies that do not adopt U.S. SEC standards or IFRS 
(4) Companies that do not change the fiscal term 
(5) Companies whose fiscal year-end is in March 
(6) Companies whose sample is available in the database 
Financial data is obtained from the Nikkei NEEDS normal companies database (Nikkei 
Media Marketing Inc.). Audit fees are obtained from the 2011 and 2012 White Book of 
Auditor and Audit Fee of Japanese Companies (edited by Kansanin Kansahoshu Kenkyukai 
(Japanese)), corporate governance data is from Nikkei CGES (Nikkei Media Marketing Inc.), 
and auditor switching data is from the timely disclosure of auditing information(from the 
Tokyo Stock Exchange Group, Inc.) I limited the samples to firms whose fiscal years end in 
March because audit firms’ policies on audit fees differ according to fiscal year ends. 
5. Verification result 
 5.1 Descriptive statistics 
Please see the Table1. I use the outlier dummy variable to reject the data of Lev, 
ROA, LIQUID, GrothSal, and RecInv data in the higher 100th percentile and the 1st 
percentile. 
[Place Table 1 here] 
5.2 Result of regression 
5.2.1 Hypothesis 1 
Key findings are displayed in Table 2 to 4. 
The results confirm that audit fees are determined by client size, complexity and 
financial distress risk, profitability and leverage. It also confirms that the relationship 
between audit fees and material weakness data is significant. First, it is determined whether th 
there is RMW, which means the auditor declares material weakness at t-1 and at t, the auditor 
deletes material weakness. Regression results suggest that the recovery from material 
weakness increases audit fees as the tasks of auditors to recover from material weakness 
increase. Further auditors adjust the risks by requiring higher audit fees. Second, SMW is 
indicated, which means at t-1, the material weakness is declared and at t, the same declaration 
is disclosed. The result of the estimation of coefficient is positively significant. The amount 
of standardized coefficient for RMW and SMW are almost level. Third, CMW is present, 
meaning that at t-1, there was no declaration of material weakness and it is declared at t. The 
 result of the estimation of coefficient is positively significant. CMW’s standardized 
coefficient is smaller than RMW and SMW. This suggests the efforts of auditors after 
declaration of material weakness exists and the efforts of auditors are reflected in the audit 
fees. The same structural results are displayed in RGC, SGC and CGC. RGC and SGC’s 
coefficients are positively significant and the standardized coefficient is almost level. On the 
other hand, CGC’s coefficient is insignificant, and standardized coefficient is much lower 
than others. However, in 2011 data analysis, the ambiguous result comes out. This result 
suggests that economic conditions or year specific conditions are needed to control in the 
regression model.  
Flexmanager’s coefficient is positively significant in all data and in the 2010 data 
analysis. The flexibility of manager’s switching increases audit fees to a certain level. In the 
internal control viewpoint, it can be said that the flexibility of manager switching is a 
determinants of internal control risks. 
Auditor SW 1st and 2nd provide ambiguous results. The hypothesis states that 
Japanese auditing firms require fixed costs and conduct the risk adjustment for the first year, 
and in auditors discount their fees in the second year. In some analyses however, the 
coefficient of Auditor SW 1st is insignificant, and the coefficient of Auditor SW 2nd is 
positively significant. In the second year, auditors charge more audit fees than in any other 
period. This result implies that audit fees and auditor switching is not directly connected. 
 Auditors do not consider the first and second years of an audit as risky. 
The coefficient of BDOUTSIDE is insignificant. A higher ratio of outside members 
to the board leads to an improvement in auditors’ independence decreasing the risk of audit 
and reducing audit fees. However, this study suggests insignificant results in reference to the 
hypothesis. In this paper, I interpret the results as stated below. An outside member institution 
is not common in Japanese business culture, and their impact on the business is unclear. The 
presence of outside members with unknown abilities and impact may be risky and institutions 
may be uncomfortable feeling about outside members. 
The coefficient of BDSTOCK is negatively significant. The results suggest that audit 
fees are lower when board members own a high percentage of the company’s stocks, which 
eliminates the fear that the board will act against management. 
The coefficient of SPECIFICST is negatively significant. If a specific stockholder 
has a high proportion of shares decision-making is faster. It is also possible to reduce internal 
control risks and improve the independence of the auditor, resulting in lower audit fees. 
[Place Table 2, Table 3, Table 4 here] 
5.2.2 Hypothesis 2 
The results of abnormal audit fees are provided in Table 5 below.This analysis 
suggests the robustness of hypothesis 1 results from using the residuals controlled by 
non-internal control risks and gaining audit tasks. The coefficients of RMW, SMW, CMW, 
 BDSTOCK, SPECIFICST and AuditorSW2nd are significant, while the coefficients of the 
other variables are insignificant. Abnormal audit fee is used as a proxy of auditors’ 
independence. As Abnormally high audit fee is similarly related to material weakness, board 
members’ shareholding and the ratio of specific stockholders as audit fees. This suggestion 
express that robustness of key analyses are sufficient. 
[Place Table 5 here] 
5.2.3 other robustness check 
High correlation 
LNAsset and LNSubsidiary have high correlation(results not tabulated). I reject the 
LNSubsidiary in the regression model, but the result of that is almost same as all variables 
analysis (results not tabulated).     
The difference of audit opinion  
I analyze the regression model of the audit fee model in all variables including 
OPINION, a dummy variable with a value of 1, if the auditors give an unqualified opinion 
with no additional information; it is 0 in all other instance. This coefficient is significant 
while the significance of the other variable does not change. Hence, the analysis is 
sufficiently robust (results are not tabulated). 
The difference of the rank data between raw data and data taking logarithm 
I use rank data on Flexmanager, BDOUTSIDE, BDSTOCK and SPECIFICST in the 
 main analysis. These raw data (not taking logarithm) are analyzed using a regression model 
and generates results similar to the main results (results are not tabulated).  
6. Conclusion and Implication 
Based on the results of the analysis, this study confirms a relationship between audit 
fees and the internal control factor. In this context, some researchers insist that auditors waive 
their independence when internal control risks are increasing. This suggests that higher audit 
fees are used as “hush money”. However, in low litigation countries like Japan, there are not 
many cases in which auditors require audit fees as “hush money”. In almost cases in Japan, 
the auditor’s effort after perceiving risks is reflected in audit fees. This study adds the risk 
variables to effort variables. 
In the results of this study, auditors require higher fees as they are taking a risk. Risk 
adjustment is not considered fraud, but Japanese auditing firms add to the sense of urgency in 
the intensely competitive environment after the elimination of the rules applicable to standard 
audit fees. In addition, this study analyzed the relationship between auditor switching and 
audit fees and identified auditor switching as a risk factor. Some U.S. studies identify the 
switching of auditors as a low-balling factor. The result of this study suggests the ambiguous 
result that auditor switching is not related to audit fees.  
This study indicates that internal control reporting affects audit quality. Abnormally 
high audit fees reduce solid independency. Since independence is connected to audit quality,  
 we discuss the relationship between audit practice, audit fees, and audit quality.  
Appendix  
The variable definitions are stated below, 
LNAuditFee: Logarithm of audit fees 
Client size and 
Client complexity 
LNAsset: Logarithm of total asset 
LNsubsidiary: Logarithm of the number of subsidiary companies 
ForeginSales: Foreign sales divided by total sales 
Clients’ specific risk 
Inherent risk 
RecInv: (receivable + inventory)/total assets 
GrothSal: Sales at t-1 term subtracted from Sales at t term then deflated by total asset. 
Financial distress risk 
Effort from perceiving financial distress risk 
RGC: Equals 1 if auditors declared the company to be a going concern for the previous term. 
All other instances equal 0 
SGC: Equal 1 if auditors declared the company to be a going concern for the previous term 
and declare the company in the same condition. All other instances equal 0 
 CGC: Equal 1 if auditors do not declare the company to be a going concern for present term, 
but declare the company to be in the same condition for the present term, All other instance 
equal 0. 
 Risk variable 
Loss: Equal 1 if the company discloses a net loss. All other instance equal 0 
LIQUID: Current assets divided by current liabilities 
Leverage 
Lev: Total liabilities divided by total assets 
Profitability 
ROA: Return on assets 
Auditor size 
Big4: Equal 1 if the audit firm is a members of the Big 4 auditing firm (Deloitte & 
Touche Tohmatsu LLP, Ernst & Young SinNihon LLC, KPMG AZSA LLC and 
PriceWaterhouceCoopers Arata LLP) All other equal 0. 
Internal control risk 
Effort from perceiving internal control risk 
RMW: Equal 1 for the previous term if the auditors declare the material weakness and do 
not declare for the present term. All others equal 0 
SMW: For the both previous term and present term auditors declare the material 
 weakness=1. All others equal 0 
CMW: Equal 1 for the previous term if the auditors do not declare material weakness and 
for the present term they declare the material weakness. All others equal 0 
Management risk 
Auditor SW1st : Equal 1 if auditors turn over on the current term. All others equal 0. 
Auditor SW2nd : Equal 1 if auditors turn over on the previous term. All others equal 0. 
FlexManager: This is ranked from 1 to 5 according to the frequency of manager turn over. 
This study uses data taking logarithms (from Nikkei CGES). 
Governance risk 
BDOUTSIDE: According to the ratio of outside board members, BDOUTSIDE is ranked 
from 1 to 5. This study uses data taking logarithms (from Nikkei CGES).  
BDSTOCK: According to the ratio of shareholding board members, BDSTOCK is ranked 
from 1 to 5. This study uses this data taking logarithms (from Nikkei CGES). 
SPECIFICST: According to ratio of share owned by specific stockholders, SPECIFICST is 
ranked from 1 to 5.This study uses data taking logarithms (from Nikkei CGES). Specific 
stockholder refers to the top ten block holders and extra stakeholders excluding unstable 
parts) 
Others  
Outliers: Dummy variables to exclude variables, such as, Lev, ROA, LIQID, RecInv, and 
 GrothSal , which are lower than the 1st percentile and higher than the 99th  percentile. 
yeardummy: year dummy variable  
inddummy: industry dummy variable 
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 Maximum Minimum Average Standard Deviation
LNAuditFee 1.946 6.522 3.623 0.554
LNSubsidiary 0.000 6.567 2.059 1.234
ForeignSales 0.000 0.996 0.155 0.222
LOSS 0.000 1.000 0.190 0.392
RGC 0.000 1.000 0.007 0.085
SGC 0.000 1.000 0.014 0.117
CGC 0.000 1.000 0.003 0.053
Lev 0.015 2.212 0.510 0.208
RecInv 0.001 0.927 0.330 0.158
GrothSal -0.857 5.046 -0.010 0.218
Flexmanager 0.000 1.609 0.792 0.611
ROA -79.600 68.160 4.161 6.128
Big 4 0.000 1.000 0.747 0.435
LIQID 0.114 58.451 2.101 1.989
RMW 0.000 1.000 0.015 0.123
SMW 0.000 1.000 0.002 0.043
CMW 0.000 1.000 0.004 0.066
AuditorSW1st 0.000 1.000 0.038 0.192
AuditorSW2nd 0.000 1.000 0.047 0.212
BDOUTSIDE 0.000 1.609 0.531 0.624
BDSTOCK 0.000 1.609 1.100 0.523
SPECIFICST 0.000 1.609 1.090 0.542
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